# Moving gates



## cda (Jan 18, 2020)

Anyone enforce any of this ??

Anyone know where the requirements come from??



Martin’s report highlighted many other problems with the way Trail Drive Management Corp., the nonprofit entity that built and operates Dickies Arena for the city, and its contractors installed the gate. For example:

The gate model used at Dickies Arena’s exhibit hall entrances, a California-built DoorKing 9230, is typically used at docks and other industrial areas, and has fewer safety features than gates designed for use in areas accessible by pedestrians.
The gate is equipped with photo sensors to detect obstructions while it is closing, but not while it’s opening.
No sensors were installed on the leading and trailing edges of the gate, as required.
A timer is in place so that after the gate is opened it automatically begins to close after 60 seconds, but there are no audio or visual warnings to let bystanders know the gate is about to move.
Warning signs were installed on the gate in two languages — English and French, but not Spanish.
No alternate pedestrian entrance is in place for the exhibit hall. National standards mandate that when this type of gate is installed in an area accessible by pedestrians, a second entrance for pedestrians and cyclists must be available.
The gate motor didn’t include a clutch pad or rotation sensor, which would release pressure on the gate’s gears in the event of an obstruction. Or, Martin wrote, if a pad or sensor was in place, it didn’t work.
The gate was set to operate moving at one foot per second, and to start immediately upon activation. A “soft-start” feature would have allowed the gate to begin moving slowly for several seconds before ramping up to its optimum speed of one foot per second. That might have given Julian time to free his arm from the metal bars — but that feature wasn’t used or didn’t work properly.
Safety motion detectors were not present.
Safety loops were embedded in the driveway under the gate to detect large objects such as automobiles, but those loops weren’t sensitive enough to detect the presence of a human.
The gate is missing a mandatory emergency stop button.

Read more here: https://www.star-telegram.com/news/local/fort-worth/article239293728.html#storylink=cpy




An electronic gate that crushed a man outside Dickies Arena was equipped with safety features that could have prevented his death but those features were defective or not properly used, a nationally recognized expert has concluded.

The preliminary report also shows at least 14 mistakes were made in the installation of the gate machinery outside Fort Worth’s new 14,000-seat arena. It is the proud centerpiece of the annual Fort Worth Stock Show & Rodeo, which began Friday and continues daily through Feb. 8.

Juan Carlos Julian Jr., 24, an employee of a company that provides cleaning crews for Dickies Arena, suffocated after becoming trapped between the gate’s metal bars. Julian, who apparently had been locked out of the building after working his overnight shift in the predawn hours of Dec. 7, reached through the gate to hit an open-close switch to let himself back into the arena — but got his arm caught between the metal bars.

The force of the gate’s electronic motor crushed him against a brick pillar. He died alone and in the dark, with his body left in a standing position wedged between the gate and pillar, until a security guard making his rounds outside Dickies Arena discovered Julian’s body at daybreak — nearly three hours later — and called 911.

Julian’s family has filed a wrongful death lawsuit against Trail Drive Management Corp., which is the nonprofit organization that runs Dickies Arena for the city. The lawsuit also names two contractors who built the $540 million arena, The Beck Group and TDIndustries.

Officials from Trail Drive Management Corp. and the contractors have declined to comment on matters related to Julian’s death, citing the lawsuit.

“It’s a tragedy, and our hearts go out to the family,” said Sheri Tillman, general counsel for TDIndustries, which served as a mechanical subcontractor on the project.

As part of that lawsuit, Kenneth Martin, a licensed gate contractor and voting member of the Underwriters Laboratories technical panel that determines national safety standards for gates and doors, was hired to examine the gate where Julian was killed. Martin was hired by Domingo Garcia, a Dallas attorney representing Julian’s family.

Martin visited Fort Worth Jan. 8 to inspect and perform tests on the 65-foot wide, sliding iron gate.

One of Martin’s key conclusions was that the gate motor, which is built by DKS DoorKing in California, featured a safety system that should have detected an object stuck in the gates and reversed the motor, which would have given Julian a chance to free himself. But the device either didn’t work or was left in a very low sensitivity setting that didn’t detect Julian’s presence, said Martin, who tested the sensor while he was in Fort Worth.

Martin’s report also concurred with two of the conclusions previously reached by the Fort Worth Star-Telegram, which investigated the matter in December and determined that Julian’s death could have been avoided had the gate been installed according to safety measures recommended by the manufacturer and at least two other organizations.

The Star-Telegram review of the gate manufacturer’s installation manual showed that the open-close switch should not have been installed within reach of the gate, because it would increase the possibility someone could try to open the gate from the outside and become trapped in the moving parts.

Also, the Star-Telegram found that the manual warns that if a gate has gaps between the metal bars of more than 2.25 inches — roughly the width of a small child’s arm — a screened wire mesh should be installed to prevent someone from reaching through the bars. The gate where Julian died has gaps larger than 2.25 inches, but no mesh covering.

Those errors went unnoticed despite dozens of inspections in the weeks before Dickies Arena opened to the public, with a Nov. 8 Twenty One Pilots concert.

“The permitting and inspection process should have caught an improperly-constructed gate at the city’s new arena,” Sriram Villupuram, an associate professor of finance and real estate at the University of Texas at Arlington, told the Star-Telegram. “The city/inspection company should have paid careful attention especially given that it is a commercial facility that will be used by large groups of the public to attend events.”

The Star-Telegram also reviewed more than 100 pages of construction permit and inspection records from Dickies Arena, as well as contracts between the city and the nonprofit organizations created for the project, and found few details about the electronic gates on the property.

Read more here: https://www.star-telegram.com/news/local/fort-worth/article239293728.html#storylink=cpy


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## ICE (Jan 18, 2020)

It can’t be all that easy to get killed by a gate.


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## jar546 (Jan 19, 2020)

So initially I am conflicted with this story.  The gate was not used as intended and he reached through the gate to bypass the security rather than call a co-worker, walk to a manned location or wait for someone else to arrive.  In doing so, he caused his own death, although obviously not his intention, there has to be a certain level of understanding that when you place yourself in a vulnerable position, you may be injured or killed.  I don't think the punishment of death fits the poor decision making but at what point do we just look at this as a tragedy due to a bad decision vs trying to hold everyone else responsible for his poor decision making?  If CA law mandates these requirements for safety and they were not checked at final by either the building department, installer or both, then I can see some liability.  To me, enacted laws are a way of transferring liability, even in the event of poor decision making by the victim.


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## ICE (Jan 19, 2020)

_Juan Carlos Julian Jr., 24, an employee of a company that provides cleaning crews_ is dead by his own hand.  Not wishing to be unkind I will tread lightly in assailing Juan's intelligence but given the mechanism of his demise it is within the realm to assume that he wasn't smart.

There are others that are complicit to a greater degree than he.....  People that design, build and inspect everything from the height of the water flowing from a fountain spigot to the density of the concrete Mr. Julian Jr. was standing on.  Yet the gate was a killer in their midst and they were apparently, unaware.  That is unacceptable.

Any and all of those people must bear responsibility for this tragedy.  To say otherwise is to deny why they exist.  You know it doesn't stop with the safety devices that malfunctioned or were missing.   The important players are supposed to anticipate poor results from that which is built and take appropriate measures to mitigate those poor results.

Juan Carlos Julian Jr. was able to easily, circumvent the reason for the gate.  Somebody didn't get their money's worth.


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## Mark K (Jan 19, 2020)

On the question of liability of the building department,  California law is clear that neither the building official nor the City has any liability to identify a code requirement that was not complied with.


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## e hilton (Jan 19, 2020)

Julian was trying to perform his job well, he got locked out and thought he had figured out to get back and finish working.  He made a bad choice and he paid heavily.   

Question ... the probably can’t be answered ... the requirements for the mesh, the second entrance, etc .... where does that come from?  Manufacturer?  Local codes?   If local codes and the inspector didn’t catch it, he should bear some responsibility.   Certainly the installer is at fault, and the construction manager too. 

 I would not blame the manufacturer, they seem to have called out in advance solutions for many, or most, of the danger points.


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## tmurray (Jan 20, 2020)

The issue I have with the items in the reporting is that they appear to be recommendations, not requirements. Certainly, a design professional might be negligent in not requiring the items mentioned based on the manufacturer's recommendation, but a building official certainly can't be negligent in enforcing something they had no ability to enforce in the first place.


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## tmurray (Jan 20, 2020)

Mark K said:


> On the question of liability of the building department,  California law is clear that neither the building official nor the City has any liability to identify a code requirement that was not complied with.



Isn't this in Texas?


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## cda (Jan 20, 2020)

Just possibly UL stuff:::::


http://www.gatekeepers.net/ARTUL325.htm


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## cda (Jan 20, 2020)

In Non UL talk:::

https://www.dasma.com/pdf/publications/techdatasheets/operatorelectronics/tds353.pdf


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## cda (Jan 20, 2020)

ICC

http://www.dasma.com/PDF/Publications/TechDataSheets/OperatorElectronics/TDS383.pdf


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## cda (Jan 24, 2020)

And the Plot thickens, and They Circle the Wagons:::


An electronic gate that crushed a man outside Dickies Arena failed a city inspection just weeks earlier, when an inspector determined it was unsafe, records show.

But despite the failed inspection Oct. 24, the inspectors and builders compromised and allowed the $540 million Dickies Arena to open to the public on schedule. Their compromise: The gate could remain on the premises, as long as it was locked in an open position whenever the building was occupied.

 This story is a subscriber exclusive
Also, while the failed inspection caught several safety violations, it didn’t flag the mistake that actually caused the worker’s death: an open-close switch installed too close to the gate’s moving parts.


Just two weeks after the inspection, Dickies Arena hosted its first event on Nov. 8, a Twenty One Pilots concert.


And a few weeks after that, in the predawn hours of Dec. 7, a member of the arena’s overnight cleaning crew, Juan Carlos Julian Jr. , 24, was crushed to death by the electronic gate. Julian had worked a shift after a TCU basketball game at the arena.

At some point, Julian was locked outside the arena, and tried to re-enter from the electronic gate. But when he reached through the gate’s iron bars to click an open switch, his arm became trapped, and the force of the gate machinery crushed him between the gate’s posts and a brick pillar.

Julian’s death illustrates a problem that many engineering and safety experts say is rampant in the construction industry. Contractors are often under pressure to get projects built on time, and seemingly obvious safety violations can be overlooked.

Allison Gray, Fort Worth assistant planning and development director, acknowledged that inspectors can make conditional agreements with builders to keep projects on schedule.

“The building had to open to meet its deadline,” Gray wrote in an email, when asked about the Dickies Arena gate inspection.


City officials have repeatedly declined to comment on whether their inspections should have caught the improperly placed open-close switch that led to Julian’s death, but the city has adopted nationally-accepted building codesthat should have prohibited the gate from being installed the way it was.

*PROBING THE DEATH*
The Star-Telegram reviewed several hundred pages of documents related to permits and inspections at Dickies Arena during three years of construction.

In all, more than 500 inspections were tallied during construction of the 14,000-seat Dickies Arena, which is hosting the annual Fort Worth Stock Show & Rodeo through Feb. 8. Most of the inspections were during construction of the building’s foundation and framing, although there also were inspections of electrical, plumbing and other features.

But none of those inspections identified the key problem related to Julian’s death. A Star-Telegram investigation found his death could have been avoided had the gate been installed according to safety measures recommended by the manufacturer and at least two other organizations.


Specifically, the Star-Telegram inquiry determined, the gate manufacturer’s installation mandates that an open-close switch should not have been installed within 10 feet of the gate’s moving parts. Julian became trapped when he reached his hand through the gate’s metal bars to click the switch, which was only inches from moving parts.

Also, the manual warns that if a gate has gaps between the metal bars of more than 2.25 inches, a screened wire mesh should be installed to prevent someone from reaching through the bars. The gate where Julian died has gaps larger than 2.25 inches, but no mesh covering.

*DETAILS OF THE FAILED INSPECTION*
But, while the inspections didn’t catch those mistakes in the gate installation, they did uncover another safety problem.

On Oct. 24, during the final inspection for the arena, a city inspector noticed that the gate where Julian was killed and an identical gate about 100 feet to the north were blocking pedestrian exits. The gates, both of which provide access to Dickies Arena’s exhibit area on the lower level east side of the building, violated International Building Code 1010, the inspector wrote.

That code essentially says it’s OK to have an electronic locking gate at a building’s point of egress, but only if the gate is staffed by a person who can control the gate at all times. Also, the code requires an alternative exit for pedestrians to avoid using the gate. Dickies Arena doesn’t offer an alternative exit.

The city inspector, Sam Caricato, wrote “turned down” on the inspection report — a phrase that Gray says means the inspection has failed, or a problem needs to be addressed.

“The turn down reference refers to multiple violations to the gate,” Gray said in her email. “The gate was not going to be staffed. There was not a side swing gate for access to a public way, etc.”

The inspection report is dated Oct. 25, although Gray says the inspector actually caught the gate violation during a visit Oct. 24. 

Another inspection report from that same day, also by Caricato, reflects the compromise that was reached to allow Dickies Arena to open on time. The notes for this report read: “east gates are to remain open while the building is occupied.”

A third-party inspection company, Winston Services Inc., was hired to handle all permitting and inspections for Dickies Arena.

*SCANT DETAILS ABOUT GATE COMPROMISE*
The city paperwork provides scant details about how the compromise was reached to allow the gate to remain on the premises.

Evan Roberts, Winston Services Inc. plan review and inspections manager, said he didn’t participate in the Dickies Arena project and couldn’t comment. Fort Worth documents show that Roberts’ predecessor, company chief executive Cherryl Peterman, handled Dickies Arena permits and inspections — but Peterman has since retired and couldn’t be reached.

Officials from Trail Drive Management Corp., the nonprofit organization formed to build and manage Dickies Arena for the city, have declined to comment on matters related to Julian’s death, citing a lawsuit.

Julian’s family filed a lawsuit in Dallas County against Trail Drive Management Corp., also known as Multipurpose Arena Fort Worth. The lawsuit also names two contractors, The Beck Group and TDIndustries.

Officials from The Beck Group and TD Industries also have declined to comment on matters related to Dickies Arena.

An out-of-state expert hired by Julian’s family as part of the wrongful death lawsuit has found that 14 mistakes were made in the installation of the gate machinery.

Dallas attorney Domingo Garcia, who represents Julian’s family, said he has investigated several hundred on-the-job injury cases and that it’s not uncommon for inspectors to miss crucial safety violations.

“There is a tendency for builders to put pressure get it done on time,” Garcia said in an interview. “It’s not unusual in city projects for people to cut corners.”


Read more here: https://www.star-telegram.com/news/local/fort-worth/article239525918.html#storylink=cpy


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## ICE (Jan 25, 2020)

I have never been tasked with inspecting such a gate.  Whenever I run into something that I lack knowledge of I ask for information.  If there is a code I find it.  If there exists installation instructions I require a copy.  I can't imagine doing it any other way.

_An out-of-state expert hired by Julian’s family as part of the wrongful death lawsuit has found that 14 mistakes were made in the installation of the gate machinery._
Probably one or two of which could cause harm.  It makes for a sensationalized story to include picayunish mistakes.

_Dallas attorney Domingo Garcia, who represents Julian’s family, said he has investigated several hundred on-the-job injury cases and that it’s not uncommon for inspectors to miss crucial safety violations._
It is not uncommon in the lawyer's experience because he has plenty of experience with injury cases.  And then there's the part about him being a lawyer.

While I condemn the inspector's performance, fair is fair.


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## e hilton (Jan 26, 2020)

cda said:


> And the Plot thickens, and They Circle the Wagons:::
> A third-party inspection company, Winston Services Inc., was hired to handle all permitting and inspections for Dickies Arena.


Based on this, i amend my position.  Here’s my thinking: if the location of the switch and/or the mesh on the gate were code items (like the 4” gap in stair bannisters) then the city inspector is at fault.  However i think it was beyond his knowledge or scope to check the closing force etc.  The third party inspector, the installer, and the gc are at fault.  
Im conflicted on the city inspector requiring the gates to be open when the arena was occupied.  That covered the egress of customers, but it didn’t donanything for egress of workers.  I think he should have required the gates to be locked open at all times until the egress was corrected.


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## cda (Jan 26, 2020)

e hilton said:


> Based on this, i amend my position.  Here’s my thinking: if the location of the switch and/or the mesh on the gate were code items (like the 4” gap in stair bannisters) then the city inspector is at fault.  However i think it was beyond his knowledge or scope to check the closing force etc.  The third party inspector, the installer, and the gc are at fault.
> Im conflicted on the city inspector requiring the gates to be open when the arena was occupied.  That covered the egress of customers, but it didn’t donanything for egress of workers.  I think he should have required the gates to be locked open at all times until the egress was corrected.




Your talking a city/ county project


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## e hilton (Jan 26, 2020)

cda said:


> Your talking a city/ county project


Point?   So maybe the “owner” is protected, but the gc and downstream still have to do it right.


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## cda (Jan 26, 2020)

e hilton said:


> Point?   So maybe the “owner” is protected, but the gc and downstream still have to do it right.




Well if you have done a city or county project, seems like the codes seem to bend a little.


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## ICE (Jan 26, 2020)

Parceling guilt starts with determining responsibility.  That it is a government owned, government funded, government superintended project lays the blame squarely on the government.  Contractors aside, it is the government that made it happen.

Focus on what killed Mr. Julian.  The gate was a supposed security gate that a man was able to reach through and hit the switch.  With the exception of placing the controls on the outside of the gate, that's the most egregious mistake possible.


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## steveray (Jan 27, 2020)

e hilton said:


> Im conflicted on the city inspector requiring the gates to be open when the arena was occupied



Occupied includes workers....It does not say occupied for events.....


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## steveray (Jan 27, 2020)

I don't lay down under garage doors to see if they rebound properly.....Not going to do it on a gate either.....Not a "code" issue....


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## cda (Jan 27, 2020)

Seems like if enforcing IBC/IFC  which includes UL 325::

after sensing an obstruction, reversing must begin within 2 seconds.This requirement is intended to keep a person from being entrapped in a stationary position by the gate system.
After the first contact the gate must reverse and travel a minimum of 2 inches. If a second contact is detected by a Type A device (inherent sensor), the gate must stop only and not reverse.If a second contact is detected by Type B1 or B2 device (photoelectric sensor or edge sensor), the gate must stop but may also reverse.
6.After any obstruction stop or reversal by either an A or B2 device, the timer-to-close is disabled until reset.Both A and 2 devices sense direct gate contact with an obstruction, and the devices must perform their intended function without interference from a timer-to-close action.
7.A Type A (inherent sensor) must stop the gate upon sensing a second sequential obstruction, must activate an audio entrapment alarm, and must not operate until an intended hardwired input is received.A person within the line of sight of the gate must see what has caused the second sequential obstruction and must resolve this obstruction before operating the gate.



Just place a brick or similar in the track, to see if it stops


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